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ABSTRACT
How much risk can we expose our research subjects to?
There is a special challenge answering this question
when the evidence on which we base our assessments
of risk is fragmentary, conﬂicting or sparse. Such
evidence does not support precise assignments of risk
(eg, there is a 24.8% chance that this patient will
develop AIDS in the next year if she participates in my
study). At best it supports imprecise assignments of risk
(eg, there is between a 5% and 35% chance that this
patient will develop AIDS in the next year if she
participates in my study). Here I discuss three approaches
to evaluating risk when probability assignments are
imprecise—an optimistic approach, a moderate approach
and a pessimistic approach. I offer a practical reason to
favour the pessimistic approach.
A central question in HIV research ethics is this:
“Antiretroviral therapy for HIV works pretty well.
HIV positive patients who interrupt it for the sake
of participating in our research studies are often
taking a risk. How much of a risk should we, the
researchers, allow them to take?”
One reply: “We should allow them to take what-
ever risks they informedly consent to. They are
autonomous adults. So long as we have told them
all that we know about the possible costs and bene-
ﬁts associated with participating in the study, we
should respect their decisions to participate”.
Another reply: “Fully informing research subjects
will sometimes involve presenting to them a
complex picture that they are unqualiﬁed to assess.
In these situations, particularly when the possibility
of a ‘cure’ is salient to them, some subjects may
want to take risks that we, the researchers, judge to
be desperate. It is not okay to be complicit in des-
perate risk taking. It is doubly not okay to do that
when we stand to beneﬁt from the desperate risk
taking. There is an upper bound to how much risk
we should allow our subjects to take”.
If we take the second reply seriously, then we
have the job of specifying just what the upper bound
is, and explaining how we tell whether it is being
exceeded. Roughly speaking, this will be a matter of
comparing the patients’ chances if they participate
in the study with their chances if they do not. Less
roughly speaking, it will be a matter of comparing
the prospect for the patient associated with partici-
pating in the study with the prospect for the patient
associated with continuing with antiretroviral
therapy. (Generally, the prospect for you associated
with an option is the set of all things that might
happen to you if you take it, weighted by the
chances they will happen if you take it. So the pros-
pect for the patient associated with continuing with
antiretroviral therapy might be a 10% chance of
living a further 50–60 immunocompromised years,
a 20% chance of living a further 40–50 immuno-
compromised years…, etc). If the expected value of
the prospect associated with participating (think of
the expected value of the prospect as the sum of the
values for the patient of each of the things that
might happen, weighted by the probability that it
will happen) is sufﬁciently close (what counts as suf-
ﬁciently close?—that will be depend on just how
desperate or self-sacriﬁcial we want to allow our
research subjects to be) to the expected value of the
prospect associated with not participating, then we
should allow participation. Otherwise we should
not.
But there’s a problem. Antiretroviral therapy for
HIV is 30 years old. Millions of people have used
it. We have an enormous amount of excellent statis-
tical data on its effectiveness. On the basis of these
data, we can often assign very precise numbers to
our patients’ chances if they continue with the
therapy. But typically, we do not have data like this
to go on when assessing our patients’ chances if
they participate in the study. How likely is it that a
patient will develop AIDS within a year if he or she
participates? We can look to the results of animal
trials, the hunches of a group of prominent scien-
tists, our understanding of viral mechanisms—and
all that may be helpful, but it does not suggest a
precise number.
Generally, in situations in which we have frag-
mentary, conﬂicting or sparse evidence for a prop-
osition, philosophers like to say that it is rational to
have imprecise levels of conﬁdence in the propos-
ition. Contrast, for example, the proposition that
the next two coins I toss will both come up heads,
with the proposition that fully autonomous vehicles
will be legal throughout the city of Boston by the
year 2036. How conﬁdent am I in the former? I
am precisely 25% conﬁdent. How conﬁdent am in
the latter? I have some grounds for conﬁdence
(Silicon Valley is marching ahead with the technol-
ogy, the economic incentives for fully autonomous
vehicles are considerable…, etc), and some grounds
for scepticism (these technologies often take longer
than one expects to mature, Boston is a challenging
urban environment…, etc). Because my evidence is
fragmentary, conﬂicting and sparse, it does not col-
lectively license an attitude of 53.4688109353…%
conﬁdence, or any attitude so precise.
But to say that a level of conﬁdence is imprecise
is not to say that it cannot be represented by
numbers; it is just to say that a single number will
not do. I am more than 5% conﬁdent that autono-
mous vehicles will be legal throughout Boston by
2016; I am less than 95% conﬁdent of that. My
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conﬁdence can be represented by a rough boundaried interval—
from around 25% to around 45%.
The problem is how to assess whether or not participation is
too risky when our levels of conﬁdence in the prospects asso-
ciated with participation are imprecise. Three basic approaches
spring to mind.
The optimistic approach
Take the most optimistic precisiﬁcation of your imprecise
levels of conﬁdence in the prospects associated with participa-
tion. If participation is too risky, under that precisiﬁcation,
then do not allow it.
The moderate approach
Take the precisiﬁcation at the mid-point of your imprecise
levels of conﬁdence in the prospects associated with participa-
tion. If participation is too risky, under that precisiﬁcation,
then do not allow it.
The pessimistic approach
Take the most pessimistic precisiﬁcation of your imprecise
levels of conﬁdence in the prospects associated with participa-
tion. If participation is too risky, under that the precisiﬁcation,
then do not allow it.
Suppose my conﬁdence that a patient will develop AIDS
within a year if she participates in my research study is best repre-
sented by a rough boundaried interval from around 5% to
around 30%. The optimistic approach would have me imagine
my being given a large volume of statistical evidence that licenses
precise 5% conﬁdence in her developing AIDS within a year. If
and only if it would be okay for me then, with precise 5% conﬁ-
dence, to allow participation, then it is okay for me now, with
imprecise 5–30% conﬁdence, to allow participation. The pessim-
istic approach would have me imagine my being given a large
volume of statistical evidence that licenses precise 30% conﬁ-
dence in her developing AIDS within a year. If and only if it
would be okay for me then, with precise 30% conﬁdence, to
allow participation, then it is okay for me now, with imprecise 5–
30% conﬁdence, to allow participation. The moderate approach
would split the difference.
Which approach is right? Philosophers who write about
rationality tend to adopt a more optimistic approach to the
rational permissibility of action. Their idea is that with impreci-
sion in levels of conﬁdence comes an expansion in the range of
things that it is rationally permissible to do.1–4 If you have 40%
conﬁdence in a proposition and I offer you an even bet on it (if
it is true I pay you a dollar, if it is false you pay me a dollar)
then it is rationally permissible for you to refuse the bet, ration-
ally impermissible for you to take it. But if you have imprecise
20–60% conﬁdence in the same proposition, then it becomes
both rationally permissible for you to refuse it (because it would
be rationally permissible for you to refuse it if you were pre-
cisely 20% conﬁdent) and rationally permissible for you to take
it (because it would be rationally permissible for you to take it if
you were precisely 60% conﬁdent).
The philosophers have reasons for going this way. They see
just three alternatives.
The lax theory of rational permissibility
It is rationally permissible for you to take an option if and
only if it would be rationally permissible for you to take it
under some precisiﬁcation of your imprecise levels of
conﬁdence.
The moderate theory of rational permissibility
It is rationally permissible for you to take an option if and
only if it would be rationally permissible for you to take it
under the precisiﬁcation at the mid-point of your imprecise
levels of conﬁdence.
The strict theory of rational permissibility
It is rationally permissible for you to take an option if and
only if it would be rationally permissible for you to take it
under every precisiﬁcation of your imprecise levels of
conﬁdence.
They ﬁnd the strict theory unsatisfactory because it says that
very often there is nothing that it is rationally permissible to do.
So, for example, when you have 20–60% conﬁdence in a prop-
osition, the strict theory says it is neither rationally permissible
to accept my even bet on it nor rationally permissible to refuse
my even bet on it. They ﬁnd the moderate theory unsatisfactory
because it says there is no practical difference between having
imprecise 20–60% conﬁdence in a proposition and having
precise 40% conﬁdence in a proposition. Surely there is a differ-
ence. So they are left with the lax theory.
These general considerations about rational permissibility
might seem to tell in favour of the optimistic approach to enrol-
ling research subjects. After all, enrolling research subjects is just
a special case of rational action. And there are obvious further
policy reasons to favour the optimistic approach. The bar for
participation will be much lower. We will get more research
subjects.
But here I want to suggest one less obvious policy reason to
favour the pessimistic approach to enrolling research subjects. A
peculiar feature of research studies is that, typically, they gener-
ate good statistical data on the prospects of their own subjects.
Because of this, we can often reasonably expect that our atti-
tudes, once the study is concluded, will be different and more
precise than our attitudes now. The intervals representing our
imprecise levels of conﬁdence will in some way shift and con-
tract. Just how will they shift and contract? Where our present
conﬁdence that the patient will develop AIDS within a year on
this medication is 5–30%, will it later be 2–4%? 4–10%? 20–
25%? 25–40%? 80–90%? Typically, we do not know. Indeed,
typically, we do not have precise levels of conﬁdence about our
future levels of conﬁdence. But there is something we can say.
Here are three propositions about our future levels of conﬁ-
dence in bad outcomes for our research subjects.
Rising lower bound
The lower bound of our future levels of conﬁdence will
exceed the lower bound of our present levels of conﬁdence.
Rising mid-point
The mid-point of our future levels of conﬁdence will exceed
the mid-point of our present levels of conﬁdence.
Rising upper bound
The upper bound of our future level of conﬁdence will
exceed the upper bound of our present levels of conﬁdence.
Because we expect the intervals representing our imprecise
levels of conﬁdence to contract, we should be more conﬁdent
in rising lower bound than in rising mid-point, and we should
be more conﬁdent in rising mid-point than in rising upper
bound. (Why? Note that, if the interval contracts, any shift that
raises the mid-point also raises the lower bound, but some
shifts that raise the lower bound do not raise the mid-point,
and any shift that raises the upper bound raises the mid-point,
but some shifts that raise the mid-point do not raise the upper
bound.)
This means that, if we adopt the optimistic or moderate
approach, we should be more conﬁdent that we are enrolling
subjects in a study that will generate evidence in light of
which it will be impermissible, by our own standards, to enrol
them, than if we adopt the pessimistic approach. But it is bad,
other things being equal, to enrol subjects in a study that gen-
erates evidence in light of which it is impermissible, by our
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own standards, to enrol them. What should we do, as this evi-
dence begins to accumulate? Our options are effectively to
ignore the accumulating evidence until the study is complete
or to refuse to allow the now too risky subjects to participate
further in the study. Neither of these options is good. Just as
it is not okay to allow subjects to take risks that we consider
desperate, so it is not okay to allow subjects to take risks that
we know we would consider desperate, if we were not now
wilfully ignoring evidence. And releasing research subjects
mid-study is a waste of time and resources—better never to
have enrolled them at all.
So we have a reason to be pessimistic in our assessment of
risks to our research subjects. That will allow us to expect to
keep them in our studies without exposing them to risks that
are by our own lights unacceptable.
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